Yellow | Breaking News! YRCW CFO Jamie Pierson Resigns!


Stephanie Fisher
Vice President and Controller at YRC Worldwide, Inc.

Kansas City, Missouri Area
Transportation/Trucking/Railroad
Current
  1. YRC Worldwide, Inc.,
  2. CommunityAmerica Credit Union
Education
  1. Kansas State University


The Refinancing from Hell
YRC's controller is glad that a 2014 refinancing didn't fall under 'troubled debt restructuring,' like a 2011 recapitalization did.

David McCann
February 10, 2015 | CFO.com | US




For Stephanie Fisher, the controller at YRC Worldwide, the company’s debt restructuring in 2014 was a walk in the park compared with two others undertaken a few years earlier.

A series of transactions in July of 2011 that included what’s known as a troubled debt restructuring (TDR) was especially mind-numbing. In a TDR, lenders grant concessions to debtor organizations with financial difficulties in a bid to avoid losing principal upon the debtor’s failure. In YRC’s case, lenders forgave $305 million of the company’s debt and rewrote its remaining debt at more favorable terms, in exchange for stock and notes convertible into stock.


Some of the particulars: the lenders received what became 4.6 million shares of common stock on a post-split basis, upon a 1-for-300 reverse stock split on Dec. 2 of that year. YRC’s shares, which had been trading for pennies and would soon have been delisted by Nasdaq, closed at $12.78 that day. The lenders also got $140 million of Series A notes convertible into common stock at the price of $34.02 per share and $100 million of Series B notes convertible at $18.54 per share.

The TDR was an enormously complex undertaking, according to Fisher — even more so than a previous dicey restructuring in 2009. “The accounting for the 2009 and 2011 restructurings was very unusual,” she says. “We had debt situations and debt facilities that even our auditor, KPMG, said they’d never seen before.”

Because of all the moving parts, completing the TDR required sifting through accounting literature to find pieces of it that addressed the specifics of the restructuring. “Accounting for the fair valuation of all the things the lenders gave up, like deferred interest, became very challenging,” says Fisher. “We had to read a lot of fine print, and a lot of it wasn’t black and white. We had to interpret it — in many cases we’d say, ‘OK, that is about our scenario, so we’ll go with these guidelines.’ There was nothing in the literature that fully addressed our very specific situation.”

The 2011 refinancing was also complicated by the fact that a majority of the lender group had also participated in YRC’s 2009 credit agreement. That required the company to account for the debt swap as a loan modification, which was much more difficult than if old debt were extinguished and new debt created, as was the case with YRC’s most recent, 2014 restructuring.


Stephanie Fisher: "We had to read a lot of fine print."

“We actually did get new debt facilities [in 2011], but from an accounting perspective [when most of the lenders are the same] it looks as if you’re modifying the old debt. When you do that, you have to take the carryover basis of the old debt and apply it to the new debt. And under troubled debt restructuring accounting, you get a lot of unusual debt premiums and discounts that then have to be amortized through the income statement.” A hangover from the TDR was not flushed out of YRC’s income statement until the 2014 refinancing.

YRC further sweetened the pot for lenders by pledging to pay the 10% interest on the Series A and Series B notes through their maturity date of March 31, 2015, even for notes that were in the money and converted to equity prior to that date. Most of the Series B notes were converted in 2013, during which the stock price topped $30 on a number of occasions. The Series A notes never got into the money, but they were converted to equity as part of the 2014 refinancing.

The TDR took Fisher out of her comfort zone. She says she loves accounting for the very reason that in most cases it is black and white: “I like the fact that there’s always a right answer.”

Still, Fisher says she thrives in a fast-paced environment. “A business acquaintance asked me the other day when I was going to get tired of running nonstop, and I said, ‘Well, I’ve been doing it for five years so I guess I like it.’ ”

For Fisher, who joined YRC in 2004 after four years with Ernst & Young, the early years were good. The company was flush with cash, and in her first year she made 100% of her bonus even though she didn’t start until August, because the bonus payouts were 200% in 2004.

Then 2008 hit. The tanking economy depleted YRC’s business volume, and Fisher’s resolve to stay with the company wavered. “There were probably 6 to 12 months when I was thinking, ‘Am I making the right choice by staying here?’ But after I interviewed externally, I realized it didn’t matter that the company wasn’t doing great, because I liked the work I was doing and the people I worked with.”

By now, says Fisher, who was promoted to controller in May 2012, it’s clear that she did make the right choice. “I’m fortunate to have worked hard and been in the right place when people left the organization. If you’d told me 10 years ago that I was going to be here 10 years later and that I’d be the corporate controller, I’d have said no way.”



http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-accounting-tax/2015/02/the-refinancing-from-hell-yrc/

:bgroovy:

Here's some interesting thoughts on Ms. Fisher's comments in that 2015 article above from a Transportation Industry reporter who I've known for years...


I thought this was interesting from Ms. Fisher...
The TDR was an enormously complex undertaking, according to Fisher — even more so than a previous dicey restructuring in 2009. “The accounting for the 2009 and 2011 restructurings was very unusual,” she says. “We had debt situations and debt facilities that even our auditor, KPMG, said they’d never seen before.”

Because of all the moving parts, completing the TDR required sifting through accounting literature to find pieces of it that addressed the specifics of the restructuring. “Accounting for the fair valuation of all the things the lenders gave up, like deferred interest, became very challenging,” says Fisher. “We had to read a lot of fine print, and a lot of it wasn’t black and white. We had to interpret it — in many cases we’d say, ‘OK, that is about our scenario, so we’ll go with these guidelines.’ There was nothing in the literature that fully addressed our very specific situation.”
“We had debt situations and debt facilities that even our auditor, KPMG, said they’d never seen before.”

Basically, she's saying they were just making ::shit:: up as they went along...

Maybe somebody should audit KPMG too? I think the books are really cooked this time?

:stirthepot:
 
Here's some interesting thoughts on Ms. Fisher's comments in that 2015 article above from a Transportation Industry reporter who I've known for years...


I thought this was interesting from Ms. Fisher...
The TDR was an enormously complex undertaking, according to Fisher — even more so than a previous dicey restructuring in 2009. “The accounting for the 2009 and 2011 restructurings was very unusual,” she says. “We had debt situations and debt facilities that even our auditor, KPMG, said they’d never seen before.”

Because of all the moving parts, completing the TDR required sifting through accounting literature to find pieces of it that addressed the specifics of the restructuring. “Accounting for the fair valuation of all the things the lenders gave up, like deferred interest, became very challenging,” says Fisher. “We had to read a lot of fine print, and a lot of it wasn’t black and white. We had to interpret it — in many cases we’d say, ‘OK, that is about our scenario, so we’ll go with these guidelines.’ There was nothing in the literature that fully addressed our very specific situation.”
“We had debt situations and debt facilities that even our auditor, KPMG, said they’d never seen before.”

Basically, she's saying they were just making :::shit::: up as they went along...

Maybe somebody should audit KPMG too? I think the books are really cooked this time?

:stirthepot:
in her last statement about the latter mou and restructuring."It was a walk in the park'Compared to the other restructuring agreements.These people have no idea what us members have done for them.It's like they are in another world.I wish someone would enlighten these folks
 
KPMG is this a firm that oversees many businesses? Because the lottery in new your is audited by them, things that make u you go him!!
 
Here's some interesting thoughts on Ms. Fisher's comments in that 2015 article above from a Transportation Industry reporter who I've known for years...


I thought this was interesting from Ms. Fisher...
The TDR was an enormously complex undertaking, according to Fisher — even more so than a previous dicey restructuring in 2009. “The accounting for the 2009 and 2011 restructurings was very unusual,” she says. “We had debt situations and debt facilities that even our auditor, KPMG, said they’d never seen before.”

Because of all the moving parts, completing the TDR required sifting through accounting literature to find pieces of it that addressed the specifics of the restructuring. “Accounting for the fair valuation of all the things the lenders gave up, like deferred interest, became very challenging,” says Fisher. “We had to read a lot of fine print, and a lot of it wasn’t black and white. We had to interpret it — in many cases we’d say, ‘OK, that is about our scenario, so we’ll go with these guidelines.’ There was nothing in the literature that fully addressed our very specific situation.”
“We had debt situations and debt facilities that even our auditor, KPMG, said they’d never seen before.”

Basically, she's saying they were just making :::shit::: up as they went along...

Maybe somebody should audit KPMG too? I think the books are really cooked this time?

:stirthepot:
I would guess that part of the problem was dumb a$$ Zollars, shooting in the dark with financials of the company... trying things that he had no idea what the ramifications could be down the road a few years. Like my favorite one, when he offered up 10 percent interest to the lenders, when the borrowing rate at the time was like half that. Talk about failure to perform the fiduciary duties.....
 
I would guess that part of the problem was dumb a$$ Zollars, shooting in the dark with financials of the company... trying things that he had no idea what the ramifications could be down the road a few years. Like my favorite one, when he offered up 10 percent interest to the lenders, when the borrowing rate at the time was like half that. Talk about failure to perform the fiduciary duties.....
10% would be a bargain compared to what they're paying now
 
Here's some interesting thoughts on Ms. Fisher's comments in that 2015 article above from a Transportation Industry reporter who I've known for years...


I thought this was interesting from Ms. Fisher...
The TDR was an enormously complex undertaking, according to Fisher — even more so than a previous dicey restructuring in 2009. “The accounting for the 2009 and 2011 restructurings was very unusual,” she says. “We had debt situations and debt facilities that even our auditor, KPMG, said they’d never seen before.”

Because of all the moving parts, completing the TDR required sifting through accounting literature to find pieces of it that addressed the specifics of the restructuring. “Accounting for the fair valuation of all the things the lenders gave up, like deferred interest, became very challenging,” says Fisher. “We had to read a lot of fine print, and a lot of it wasn’t black and white. We had to interpret it — in many cases we’d say, ‘OK, that is about our scenario, so we’ll go with these guidelines.’ There was nothing in the literature that fully addressed our very specific situation.”
“We had debt situations and debt facilities that even our auditor, KPMG, said they’d never seen before.”

Basically, she's saying they were just making :::shit::: up as they went along...

Maybe somebody should audit KPMG too? I think the books are really cooked this time?

:stirthepot:
Here's a few more thoughts from my Transportation Industry reporter...

Maybe Jamie will take a job as a sous chef in Big D. He's had enough time in Welch's kitchen to learn a few dishes. On Jamie's personal menu tonight, we bring you these favorites:

EBITA, lightly sauteed over brocolini with a white wine sauce, mushrooms, $46.
Slightly seared pan roasted Debt Amortization with organic greens and salad, $38.
Pan-fried Q1 16 Earnings Projections with long grain rice and fried plantains, $41.

xebsSd2.jpg

:poke:
 
when we all we forced to commute from winston salem to charlotte we asked for some leeway when it came to start time . was 1 1/2 drive . we would leave 2 hours before but if anything happened on the road might be a few late . we were told absolutely not and we should just move closer to the job
 
Here's a few more thoughts from my Transportation Industry reporter...

Maybe Jamie will take a job as a sous chef in Big D. He's had enough time in Welch's kitchen to learn a few dishes. On Jamie's personal menu tonight, we bring you these favorites:

EBITA, lightly sauteed over brocolini with a white wine sauce, mushrooms, $46.
Slightly seared pan roasted Debt Amortization with organic greens and salad, $38.
Pan-fried Q1 16 Earnings Projections with long grain rice and fried plantains, $41.

xebsSd2.jpg

:poke:
My firm,BRG Patel Consulting, has examined the books of YRC and our position is,at this time, there are no indications that there has been any discrepancies in the calculations of earnings or losses, but that there may be indications that further review of said books, may need to be reevaluated in the first quarter of 2017, or beyond then, for possible, or actual figures that may or may not be accurate, and could trigger an audit of the past 5 years that "the stove", was in complete control of these said figures....
 
Just Goggle the number of CFO"S from other coma that have gone to prision for cookonh the books
My firm,BRG Patel Consulting, has examined the books of YRC and our position is,at this time, there are no indications that there has been any discrepancies in the calculations of earnings or losses, but that there may be indications that further review of said books, may need to be reevaluated in the first quarter of 2017, or beyond then, for possible, or actual figures that may or may not be accurate, and could trigger an audit of the past 5 years that "the stove", was in complete control of these said figures....
Prison time not fun for Ex-CFO's !! this maybe WHY so many CFO's have Quit over the past years ???
 
Just Goggle the number of CFO"S from other coma that have gone to prision for cookonh the books

Prison time not fun for Ex-CFO's !! this maybe WHY so many CFO's have Quit over the past years ???
if Trump gets wind of this he may purse these dogs..
Way too many CFO's through the rotating door, something is wrong...
 
Curious, How many cfo's.? I saw a list recently but now unable to locate it.
We have had 6 CFO's since the Yellow acquisition of Roadway in 2003...
Donald Barger 2000-2007
Stephen Bruffet 2007-2009
Sheila Taylor 2009-2011
William Trubeck (interim) 2011-2011
Jamie Pierson 2011-2016
Stephanie Fisher (interim) 2017-

YRC CFO Jamie Pierson leaves at short notice

https://management-change.com/yrc-cfo-jamie-pierson-leaves-at-short-notice-2/6195

Unexpected

Generally speaking, when a top manager announces to step aside with no permanent successor in place, it’s a sign that the change was unexpected and too early.

Signs for push-out forces

It is not completely certain what forces eventually triggered Jamie Pierson’s move.

The Push-out Score™ determined by management-change.com suggests that push-out forces may have contributed to the management change.
:stirthepot:


The above from an earlier posting under "Sinking Ship Signs" on the YRC Freight Forum.
 
We have had 6 CFO's since the Yellow acquisition of Roadway in 2003...
Donald Barger 2000-2007
Stephen Bruffet 2007-2009
Sheila Taylor 2009-2011
William Trubeck (interim) 2011-2011
Jamie Pierson 2011-2016
Stephanie Fisher (interim) 2017-

YRC CFO Jamie Pierson leaves at short notice

https://management-change.com/yrc-cfo-jamie-pierson-leaves-at-short-notice-2/6195

Unexpected

Generally speaking, when a top manager announces to step aside with no permanent successor in place, it’s a sign that the change was unexpected and too early.

Signs for push-out forces

It is not completely certain what forces eventually triggered Jamie Pierson’s move.

The Push-out Score™ determined by management-change.com suggests that push-out forces may have contributed to the management change.
:stirthepot:


The above from an earlier posting under "Sinking Ship Signs" on the YRC Freight Forum.
thank you........
 
Here's a few more thoughts from my Transportation Industry reporter...

Maybe Jamie will take a job as a sous chef in Big D. He's had enough time in Welch's kitchen to learn a few dishes. On Jamie's personal menu tonight, we bring you these favorites:

EBITA, lightly sauteed over brocolini with a white wine sauce, mushrooms, $46.
Slightly seared pan roasted Debt Amortization with organic greens and salad, $38.
Pan-fried Q1 16 Earnings Projections with long grain rice and fried plantains, $41.

xebsSd2.jpg

:poke:
And it all comes in a can.Or MRE. Meals ready to eat.Just heat and serve
 
We have had 6 CFO's since the Yellow acquisition of Roadway in 2003...
Donald Barger 2000-2007
Stephen Bruffet 2007-2009
Sheila Taylor 2009-2011
William Trubeck (interim) 2011-2011
Jamie Pierson 2011-2016
Stephanie Fisher (interim) 2017-

YRC CFO Jamie Pierson leaves at short notice

https://management-change.com/yrc-cfo-jamie-pierson-leaves-at-short-notice-2/6195

Unexpected

Generally speaking, when a top manager announces to step aside with no permanent successor in place, it’s a sign that the change was unexpected and too early.

Signs for push-out forces

It is not completely certain what forces eventually triggered Jamie Pierson’s move.

The Push-out Score™ determined by management-change.com suggests that push-out forces may have contributed to the management change.
:stirthepot:


The above from an earlier posting under "Sinking Ship Signs" on the YRC Freight Forum.
My guess is these CFO's do not want to sign any financial documents. After Enron they are personally liable and could face prison for putting out false financial information and reports to the Federal Government.

This may become a regular occurrence.
 
We have had 6 CFO's since the Yellow acquisition of Roadway in 2003...
Donald Barger 2000-2007
Stephen Bruffet 2007-2009
Sheila Taylor 2009-2011
William Trubeck (interim) 2011-2011
Jamie Pierson 2011-2016
Stephanie Fisher (interim) 2017-

YRC CFO Jamie Pierson leaves at short notice

https://management-change.com/yrc-cfo-jamie-pierson-leaves-at-short-notice-2/6195

Unexpected

Generally speaking, when a top manager announces to step aside with no permanent successor in place, it’s a sign that the change was unexpected and too early.

Signs for push-out forces

It is not completely certain what forces eventually triggered Jamie Pierson’s move.

The Push-out Score™ determined by management-change.com suggests that push-out forces may have contributed to the management change.
:stirthepot:


The above from an earlier posting under "Sinking Ship Signs" on the YRC Freight Forum.
The dude was not pushed out. When the light at the end of the tunnel is off you get off the tracks. He already has a CFO position in Dallas with a construction materials firm.
 
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